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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Gary James Pylican appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of a
controlled substance, challenging the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. The district
court erred in denying Mr. Pylican’s motion to suppress because the officer who stopped
Mr. Pylican’s vehicle did not have reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity at the
time of the stop.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On October 12, 2017, Mr. Pylican entered a storage facility through a security gate prior
to 10:00 p.m., the posted closing time, to move his belongings from one storage unit into
another, and to clean up spilled motor oil inside one of the units. (Tr., p.19, Ls.20-23, p.23, Ls.17.) Officer Geisel observed Mr. Pylican and others inside the storage facility, and was concerned
about “possibly burglaries going on.” (Tr., p.55, Ls.9-14.) Officer Geisel called for an assist unit,
and Officer DeLeon arrived on scene. (Tr., p.55, Ls.15-20, p.66, Ls.16-22, p.67, Ls.4-5.)
Officers Geisel and DeLeon watched Mr. Pylican and others inside the storage facility,
and observed them leave in two vehicles at approximately 12:30 a.m. (Tr., p.55, L.23 – p.56,
L.3.) Officer Geisel conducted a traffic stop on the first vehicle, and Officer DeLeon stopped the
second vehicle, which was Mr. Pylican’s truck. (Tr., p.56, Ls.7-9, p.69, Ls.4-9.) Officer DeLeon
testified he initiated the stop “[i]mmediately after exiting the storage unit” when he activated his
“overheads.” (Tr., p.71, Ls.9-12, p.98, Ls.20-25.) Officer DeLeon said in his police report that he
stopped Mr. Pylican for “exiting the storage unit facility after it was closed.” (R., p.60.) He
testified at the suppression hearing that he initiated the stop to investigate why Mr. Pylican was
in the storage facility after hours. (Tr., p.76, L.19 – p.77, L.1.) He confirmed on cross-
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examination that he decided to pull Mr. Pylican over before he exited the storage complex.
(Tr., p.94, Ls.11-14.)
Mr. Pylican parked his truck in an unpaved parking area just across the street from the
storage complex, next to his apartment. (Tr., p.18, L.22 – p.19, L.2, p.21, Ls.5-7, p.100, Ls.1921.) Officer DeLeon parked behind Mr. Pylican’s truck, and made contact with Mr. Pylican at
the back of his truck. (Tr., p.71, Ls.9-18.) Officer DeLeon testified he asked Mr. Pylican why he
was in the storage unit and “[h]e informed me he was moving from I believe [a] small unit to a
larger unit. And that he had been in there before it closed and was in there the entire time until he
was contacted by us after leaving.” (Tr., p.77, Ls.2-11.) Officer DeLeon testified he found
Mr. Pylican’s story to be “very plausible.” (Tr., p.96, Ls.9-12.)
Officer DeLeon asked for identification from Mr. Pylican and the passenger, and learned
the passenger had an outstanding arrest warrant. (R., p.126.) Officer DeLeon ran the routine
checks, which took longer than usual, and ultimately confirmed the arrest warrant for the
passenger was valid, and could be executed. (R., p.126.) As found by the district court, Officer
DeLeon “did not try to contact the storage facility’s owner to verify Pylican’s story” during the
approximately twenty minutes he was waiting on the routine checks. (R., p.127.) Indeed:
He did not contact Deputy Geisel to check Pylican’s story against what Deputy
Geisel learned from the others who had been at the facility. He did not take any
other discernible action to investigate any lingering concern about Pylican’s afterhours presence there. No evidence was presented as to any further action he
intended to take at any time to investigate that concern.
(R., p.127.)
Officer DeLeon decided to search Mr. Pylican for weapons, and, with the help of a
second officer, commanded Mr. Pylican out of the truck while a third officer arrested the
passenger. (R., p.127.) After getting consent from Mr. Pylican for a search of his pockets, Officer
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DeLeon found “a wad of money, hidden within which was a bag containing a white crystalline
substance.” (R., p.128.) Officer DeLeon arrested Mr. Pylican. (R., p.128.)
Mr. Pylican was charged by Information with one count of possession of a controlled
substance. (R., pp.30-31.) He filed a motion to suppress. (R., pp.48-60, 78-93, 128.) The State
disputed Mr. Pylican’s arguments, and argued Mr. Pylican could not challenge anything related
to the stop because he was on parole at the time of the stop, and had executed a Fourth
Amendment waiver. (R., p.128.) Following a hearing, the district court issued a memorandum
decision and order denying Mr. Pylican’s motion to suppress. (R., pp.125-40.)
The district court held, as an initial matter, that Mr. Pylican’s Fourth Amendment waiver
“does not
- preclude him from challenging the lawfulness of the seizure that created the
opportunity for the search [of his pockets].” (R., p.130.) The court noted that Officer DeLeon
was not aware of the Fourth Amendment waiver at the time of the stop, and was not relying on
that waiver as a basis to search Mr. Pylican’s pockets. (R., p.129.)
The district court then held the stop “was lawful at its outset” because (1) Mr. Pylican’s
after-hours presence at the storage facility may have violated a county ordinance prohibiting
disorderly conduct, and (2) the way Mr. Pylican parked his truck upon pulling over was a traffic
violation. (R., pp.131-33.) The court next held the stop had not been unlawfully prolonged when
Mr. Pylican’s pockets were searched because the officer was diligently pursuing the routine
checks. (R., pp.133-37.) Finally, the court held the officer lawfully ordered Mr. Pylican out of his
truck for purposes of officer safety. (R., pp.137-38.)
Following the district court’s ruling, the State filed an Information Part II alleging
Mr. Pylican is a persistent violator within the meaning of Idaho Code § 19-2514. (R., pp.147-49.)
Mr. Pylican then entered into an agreement with the State pursuant to which he pled guilty to the
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charged offense and to being a persistent violator, reserving his right to appeal from the denial of
his motion to suppress. (R., pp.161, 165; Tr., p.136, Ls.10-22.) The district court accepted
Mr. Pylican’s plea, and sentenced him to a unified term of ten years, with three years fixed, to be
served concurrently to his sentences in four other cases. (R., p.169; Tr., p.134, Ls.1-8, p.158,
L.21 – p.159, L.9.) The judgment of conviction was filed on June 11, 2018, and Mr. Pylican filed
a timely notice of appeal on June 15, 2018. (R., pp.168-75.)

4

ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Pylican’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Pylican’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
In ruling on Mr. Pylican’s motion to suppress, the district court properly recognized

Officer DeLeon “had no reasonable and articulable suspicion that Pylican was stealing from
storage units” and his concern about theft “was just a hunch.” (R., p.133.) The district court
concluded, however, that the stop of Mr. Pylican’s truck was lawful for either of two
independent reasons: first, because Mr. Pylican’s after-hours presence at the storage facility may
have violated a county ordinance prohibiting disorderly conduct, and second, because the way
Mr. Pylican parked his truck upon pulling over was a traffic violation. (R., pp.131-33.) The
district court erred, as neither of these reasons could provide a constitutionally-sufficient basis
for the stop.

B.

Standard Of Review
“In reviewing a district court order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence,

the standard of review is bifurcated.” State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 (2009) (citation
omitted). “This Court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous. However, this Court may freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional
principles in light of the facts found.” Id. (citations omitted). “At a suppression hearing, the
power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court.” State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562 (Ct. App.
2005) (citations omitted).
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C.

The Stop Of Mr. Pylican’s Truck Violated Mr. Pylican’s Rights Under The Fourth
Amendment Because, At The Time Of The Stop, Officer DeLeon Did Not Have
Reasonable And Articulable Suspicion Of Criminal Activity
“A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants and

implicates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
State v. Spies, 157 Idaho 269, 272 (Ct. App. 2014) (citations and footnote omitted). While a
seizure must typically be based on probable cause to be reasonable, a limited investigatory
detention is permissible “when justified by an officer’s reasonable articulable suspicion that a
person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime.” State v. Bly, 159 Idaho 708, 710
(Ct. App. 2016) (citation omitted). “Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is
evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of
the detention.” Id. (citations omitted).

1.

The First Reason Relied On By The District Court Could Not Provide A
Constitutionally-Sufficient Basis For The Stop

The district court first held the stop of Mr. Pylican’s truck was lawful based on Ada
County Code § 5-4-4(C), which prohibits disorderly conduct. (R., p.133.) The district court
recognized Officer DeLeon “does not seem to have relied on this ordinance in making the stop,”
which is somewhat of an understatement, as the first reference in this case to the ordinance is in
the State’s brief in opposition to Mr. Pylican’s motion to suppress. (R., p.133.) Officer DeLeon
did not mention this ordinance to Mr. Pylican on the night he was stopped; he did not mention it
in his police report; and he did not mention it at the suppression hearing.
More importantly, the State failed to prove the existence of this ordinance in the district
court. The State cited the ordinance in its opposition brief, but did not ask the district court to
take judicial notice of the ordinance, and did not otherwise prove the existence of the ordinance.
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(R., p.100.) The State never provided an official copy of the ordinance to the district court, and
cited only a portion of the ordinance in a footnote in its opposition brief. (R., p.100.) The
existence of an ordinance is a factual question that must be proven to the trier of fact. See
Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho 867 (1988); People v. Buchanan, 1 Idaho 681 (1878). The State
failed to prove the existence of Ada County Code § 5-4-4(C).
Even if this Court excuses the State’s failure to prove the existence of Ada County
Code § 5-4-4(C), this ordinance still does not provide a sufficient basis for the stop of
Mr. Pylican’s truck, as it does not prohibit the lessor of a storage unit from accessing that unit
outside of posted business hours. Ada County Code § 5-4-4(C) apparently states:
Any person who shall conduct himself/herself in a violent, noisy, or riotous
manner, or in any way commit a breach of the peace of another person(s), and/or
who shall conduct himself/herself in a matter that endangers the health and safety
of another person(s), and/or who conducts himself/herself in any other manner as
specified in this section, is guilty of a misdemeanor, and a violation of this section
shall include, but not be limited to, the following:
*

*

*

C. Occupying, lodging or sleeping in any building, structure, or place, whether
public or private, or any automobile, truck, railroad car or other similar vehicles
or equipment without the permission of the owner or the person entitled to
possession or in control thereof.
(R., p.100.)1 The State argued in the district court that this ordinance prohibited Mr. Pylican from
being at the storage facility after the business was closed. (R., p.100.) That is not what this
ordinance prohibits.

1

The Clerk’s Record does not contain an official copy of Ada County Code § 5-4-4(C). At the
time of the filing of this brief, an unofficial copy of this ordinance was not available on the Ada
County website. See https://adacounty.id.gov/clerk/CountyCode (last visited March 25, 2018)
(stating, “That page can’t be found.”).
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The section the State relies on prohibits “occupying, lodging or sleeping” in any of the
defined locations or vehicles without proper permission. As used in this sequence, the word
“occupying” means more than merely being present; instead, it means something more like
residing, or taking over for a period of time. There is no indication Mr. Pylican was residing at
the storage facility, or taking the facility over for a period of time. Instead, the only evidence
suggests Mr. Pylican was merely moving belongings from unit to another. He was thus not
occupying, lodging or sleeping at the storage facility. Moreover, Mr. Pylican had permission
from the owner to be present at the storage facility, as he was renting a storage unit from the
facility, and was told he had 24-hour access to his unit. (Exs., pp.10-14; Tr., p.22, Ls.4-11, p.26,
Ls.4-7.) The mere fact that the officers observed Mr. Pylican to be at a business outside of
business hours does not give rise to reasonable suspicion that Mr. Pylican was committing
disorderly conduct within the meaning of Ada County Code § 5-4-4(C).

2.

The Second Reason Relied On By The District Court Could Not Provide A
Constitutionally-Sufficient Basis For The Stop

The district court also held the stop of Mr. Pylican’s truck was lawful because Officer
DeLeon had reasonable and articulable suspicion that Mr. Pylican parked illegally after leaving
the storage facility. (R., p.133.) The problem with this rationale is that “the reasonableness of
the suspicion must be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances at the time of the
stop.” State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 410 (2012) (emphasis added). Officer DeLeon testified
he initiated the traffic stop “[i]mmediately after exiting the storage unit” when he activated his
“overheads.” (Tr., p.71, Ls.9-12; p.98, Ls.20-25.) He confirmed on cross-examination that he
decided to pull Mr. Pylican over before he exited the storage complex. (Tr., p.94, Ls.11-14.)
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Because Mr. Pylican did not park his truck until after he was pulled over, the manner in which he
parked his truck cannot provide reasonable suspicion for the stop.
At the time of the stop, Officer DeLeon did not have reasonable and articulable suspicion
of criminal activity. Thus, the stop violated Mr. Pylican’s rights under the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and the district court erred in denying Mr. Pylican’s motion to
suppress.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Pylican respectfully requests that the Court vacate his conviction, reverse the district
court’s order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district court for further
proceedings.
DATED this 3rd day of April, 2019.
/s/ Andrea W. Reynolds
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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